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I. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 0 with 2 
abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mrs. von Bothmer 
(Chairman) ; MM. Sarti (Alternate: Treu), Portheine 
(Vice-Chairmen) ; Mr. Ariosto, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. Berrier, Brugnon, Deschamps, Druon, Faulds 
(Alternate : MoGuire), Gessner, Gonella, Hanin, Lord 
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McNair (Alternate: Page), MM. Mange'lsohots, Mende,· 
Minnoooi, Mo=ersteeg, Muller, Peridier, Perin (Alter-
nate: van Watersohoot), Lord Reay (Alternate : 
Atkinson), MM. Reddemann, Segre, Thoss, Urwin, Voogd 
(Alternate : Sohlingemann). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in itaZios. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on political conditions for European armaments co-operation 
The Assembly, 
Noting with interest the work of the symposium on a. European armaments policy held in 
Brussels from 15th to 17th October 1979 ; 
Noting that in the opinion of most of the experts consulted only a. pragmatic approach is 
likely to advance European armaments co-operation in the future ; 
Convinced, however, that Europe will have to assume increasing responsibility for its own secu-
rity, particularly insofar as this involves conventional weapons ; 
Considering that the production of armaments brings into play a broad spectrum of unequal 
interests in the various member countries ; 
Thanking the Council for having authorised the Head of the International Secretariat of the 
Standing Armaments Committee to present to the Assembly his conclusions on the juridical obstacles 
to co-operation reached as a result of the enquiry conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee 
in accordance with a. wish often expreBbed by the Assembly ; 
Recalling its Recommendation 335 ; 
Rejecting the aBSertions in paragraph 4 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 331 
and in the corresponding paragraphs of the replies to Recommendations 325 and 330; 
Recalling that the WEU Assembly is, as explicitly admitted by the Council, the only Euro-
pean assembly with defence responsibilities, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNciL 
I. Use every means at its disposal to promote co-operation between its members in the produc-
tion of armaments ; 
2. Examine, inter alia on the basis of the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, by what 
means it would be possible to establish in Western Europe, account being taken of the specific 
responsibilities of each institution : 
(a) an organisation responsible for gathering and circulating all necessary information on Euro-
pean supply and demand in the field of armaments ; 
(b) a. body responsible for analysing choices of armaments programmes and their overall finan-
cial, technical, economic and social repercussions ; 
(c) appropriate customs legislation for transfers of armaments between Western European 
states; 
(d) appropriate legislation for transnational bodies producing armaments; 
(e) legislation designed to promote exchanges of technology between European industries; 
(/) legislation and effective action against the illicit production of and traffic in armaments ; 
3. Encourage all member states to co-operate by communicating all the information needed to 
facilitate this work ; 
4. Re-examine and explain the positions expressed in paragraph 4 of its replies to Recommenda-
tions 325 and 331 and inform the Assembly of developments in the work of the IEPG as it under-
took to do in its reply to Recommendation 298. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur) 
1. At its session in June 1979, the Assembly 
adopted Recommendation 335 proposing to the 
Council a framework for . promoting closer 
co-operation in armaments production. The sym-
posium held in Brussels from 15th to 17th 
October 1979, and in particular the work of 
its Working Group II for which the General 
Affairs Committee had special responsibility, 
did not incite your Rapporteur to change course 
in the present report. He is including at appendix 
the general report submitted by Mr. Schmidt 
on behalf of Working Group II so that all who 
are interested may take cognisance of the results 
of this work. 
2. This in no way means that the symposium 
was not highly instructive, as may be seen from 
the recommendation accompanying this report. 
But the lessons learned bring grist and cla-
rification to the direction already followed by 
the Assembly rather than any fundamental 
change. 
3. As he is appending the general report, your 
Rapporteur does not consider that he, for his 
part, needs to review the symposium. He will 
merely make a few remarks which concern more 
specifically the recommendation. 
4. He first wishes to congratulate and thank 
the WEU Council for having acceded to a wish 
frequently expressed by the Assembly, particu-
larly when adopting the report which he already 
submitted to it on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee last June, by authorising Mr. Plantey, 
Head of the International Secretariat of the 
Standing Armaments Committee, to describe to 
the symposium the lessons and experience he had 
gained in directing the inquiry into the European 
armaments industries which the SAC 1 had been 
asked to make, with particular regard to the 
section on the juridical aspects which has now 
been completed and transmitted to the govern-
ments. Your Rapporteur trusts that it will not 
now be allowed to gather dust in governmental 
archives. Our task will be to urge governments 
to draw the full benefits from it in the years to 
come. 
5. The document which he submitted to us for 
discussion shows clearly that the European arma-
ments market is far from being just a national 
market extended to European dimensions and 
that any differences there may be between the 
legal position of firms in each country and the 
obstacles still standing in the way of European 
co-operation in this field conceal something far 
deeper : political differences stemming from 
1. Standing Armaments Committee (WEU). 
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national traditions and each country's history 
and freedom in foreign policy and the organ-
isation of its defence. The matters he covers 
are not legal alone, it is for politicians to 
seek solutions which can but be political. In 
this connection, Mr. Plantey gives many useful 
indications and suggestions, pointing to a series 
of directions in which immediate progress seems 
possible and desirable. For instance, there is no 
reason why the instruments of co-production 
responsible for manufacturing a given type of 
weapon should remain subject only to the 
national laws of the country in which they have 
their head office. Nor is there any reason why 
the problem of customs duties on imports of 
military equipment by our countries should not 
be settled reasonably and permanently. 
6. When considering the present report on 
5th November 1979, certain members of the 
Committee stressed that they did not consider 
customs obstacles to be a major hindrance to the 
development of transfers of armaments within 
"\Vestern Europe and that certain countries' 
administrative and trade practices were also an 
impediment. The Committee therefore wished the 
Council to react against a proteetionist spirit and 
protectionist practices in this field of armaments 
not covered by the Rome Treaty. 
7. Similarly, questions raised by technology 
transfer might, at least within the European 
Communities, be solved quickly and satisfactorily. 
Very cautiously, Mr. Plantey concludes that 
Europe is moving towards a reduction in the 
unilateral nature of decisions in armaments mat-
ters. It is this trend that we must identify 
and direct. 
8. Further, your Rapporteur wishes to under-
line the importance of the suggestions made by 
Professor Greenwood on the economic aspects 
of the problem. He has not hesitated to include 
them in his recommendation because he felt them 
to be particularly pertinent and well-suited to 
what the Assembly might in fact ask of the 
Council. He wishes to thank their author. 
9. In drafting the recommendation which it 
adopted, the Committee retained the terms which 
Professor Greenwood had deliberately left rather 
vague in the paper which he submitted to the 
symposium : an "organisation" responsible for 
circulating information, a "body" responsible for 
analysis. In view of prevailing uncertainty about 
the attributions of existing intra-European bodies 
(IEPG, SAC or even the EEC), the results 
actually achieved by each one and what they 
are to become, the Committee wished to spell out, 
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like Professor Greenwood, the functions ·which 
it thought ought to be fulfilled without embark-
ing on an institutional debate. Professor Green-
wood's paper is, moreover, detailed enough in 
defining these functions for your Rapporteur 
merely to refer, in this conneetion, to the official 
record of the Brussels symposium and to recall 
the usefulness for European co-operation of ade-
quate information about armaments requirements 
as defined by national defence staffs, planned 
procurement schedules and the capabilities and 
forecasts of firms producing armaments. This 
exchange of information is distinct from the 
function of analysing armaments programmes 
with a view to informing parties to contracts or 
markets in this field. 
10. This does not mean that the other papers 
submitted to Working Group II were not most 
valuable and important, although the subjects 
and the direction followed by their authors may 
have been less suitable for recommendations to 
the WEU Council. They will be published in the 
official record of the symposium which should 
be read in conjunction with this report. On 
behalf of the Committee, your Rapporteur wishes 
to take this opportunity of conveying his most 
sincere thanks to all those who contributed. 
11. Several of the Council's · replies to recom-
mendations adopted by the Assembly at the 
June 1979 session also relate to Buropean arma-
ments co-operation. They therefore call for a 
few comments by your Rapporteur. 
12. Two points in particular attracted his 
attention. First, in its reply to Recommendation 
330, the Council sets out clearly the way in which 
it intends to inform the Assembly of the work 
undertaken by the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee as follows : 
"At their meeting at ministerial level on 
16th May 1979, rthe Council decided not to 
circulate the study chapter by chapter. As 
soon as the complete text is in their posses-
sion, the Council will consider the content 
and appropriate form of the information to 
be given to the Assembly." 
13. This reply might have seemed rather 
unsatisfactory if, on the other hand, the Council 
had not authorised 1\fr. Plantey to address Work-
ing Group II of the Brussels symposium on the 
juridical obstacles to European armaments 
co-operation. This gesture of goodwill allows 
the Assembly rto defer to a decision, the reasons 
for which it has difficulty in grasping in view 
of the Council's laconic replies. 
14. Conversely, your Rapporteur must expre&<3 
surprise at paragraph 4 of the reply to Recom-
mendation 331 (referred to in the reply to 
Recommendation 330) in which it is stated : 
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"As stated in their reply to Recommendation 
325, it would be difficult for the Council 
as such to inform the Assembly about the 
activities of the IEPG, since its member-
ship is different from that of WEU, with 
which it has no organisational links. How-
ever, it is open to members of the Assembly 
to question their governments on this sub-
ject, through their national parliaments." 
15. Admittedly, paragraph 4 of the reply to 
Recommendation 325 expressed a similar position, 
aUhough less curtly, but since it did not reach 
the Assembly until just before the June session, 
your Rapporteur was not able to mention it 
in his previous report. 
16. Without denying possible problems for the 
Council in reporting to the Assembly on the 
work of the IEPG, it seems difficult to accept the 
Council's reply as worded. What is meant by the 
statement that \VEU has no "organisational 
links" with the IEPG 1 The WEU Council agrees 
to inform the Assembly, insofar as possible, of 
the way in which questions within its purview are 
handled in the framework of other organisations 
with which WEU has no "organisational" links. 
It has done so on several occasions, as indicated 
in its reply to Recommendation 298 which 
specifies that : 
"In their annual reports, the Council provide 
the Assembly with the appropriate inform-
ation on their work, together with any 
information which can be included on mat-
ters relating to the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty by its signatories 
in bodies other than WEU." 
17. What is rthe reason for its refusal in this 
specific case 1 Is it not thus calling in question 
its oft-repeated assertion that the Assembly is 
"the only European assembly with defence 
responsibilities" 1 Or is co-ordination of the work 
of the various European bodies dealing with 
armaments so inexistent that it has no inform-
ation about the work of the IEPG 1 This is 
difficult to believe when it is recalled that it 
was agreed that the SAC should base its work 
on the standards laid down by the IEPG. 
18. The Council's attitude is all the more 
inexplicable since it recommends members of the 
Assembly to question their governments through 
their national parliaments. If the governments 
are informed of the work of the IEPG, how is it 
that the Council is not 1 Neither the effective 
lack of information nor the absence of organisa-
tional links is a credible reason for the Council's 
refusal. 
19. Is there not another reason, less easy to 
admit : that one or other of its members is 
challenging the right of any European organisa-
tion to deal with armaments questions 1 This 
refusal may be justifiable in the case of the 
Communities and of the European Parliament in 
view of the provisions of the Rome Treaty and 
the supranational nature of these institutions. 
It is not so in the case of WEU in view of the 
provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and 
the intergovernmental nature of the organisation. 
20. If it were to be thought that this situation 
might lead rto the European Parliament taking 
over supervision of the work of the IEPG, there 
is every reason to believe that they would be 
making a serious mistake. There is nothing to 
show - and certainly not the replies of the 
Council- that what is refused an assembly with 
responsibility for such matters would be granted 
to another parliamentary assembly without res-
ponsibility in this field. Nor is it evident that 
those wishing to avoid the provisions of a treaty 
that they have signed would accept controls to 
which nothing commits them. In view of the 
difficult situation through which Europe is now 
passing, there is every reason to fear that what 
WEU might lose today would be lost by Europe 
for a long time to come if the transfer of the 
exercise of the responsibilities of one institution 
to another was not done in a formal manner. 
21. Should the Council maintain its position in 
this matter, it would be a considerable setback 
in progress towards European armaments 
co-operation and would also place in doubt the 
agreement painfully reached between the Council 
and the Assembly on their mutual relations. 
22. Finally, the Council's reply to Recommend-
ation 335 on the report of the General Affairs 
Committee on political conditions for European 
armaments co-operation, although not giving a 
sufficiently detailed answer to the various points 
in the recommendation, nevertheless demonstrates 
that, on the whole, the Council seems to concur 
with the views expressed by the Assembly. 
23. However, in several respects, it did not 
really reply to the recommendation. For instance, 
the Council states that : 
" ... the SAC was not in a position to submit 
its final report when the Ministerial Council 
met in Rome on 16th May 1979 ... " 
hut does not say why the SAC was not in a 
position to submit its report. It is not enough 
for the Council to consider that : 
"... the first part of the economic study 
should be completed both swiftly and to 
the best effect, with the co-operation of 
the administrations concerned" ; 
the Council, or at least its members, should 
ensure that this co-operation is effectively forth-
coming without reservation or limitations. 
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24. Second, it must be noted that the Council 
gives no undertaking about what is to be done 
with the SAC's work, and this makes it incum-
bent on the Assembly to follow attentively the 
way the Council follows up this study in practice. 
25. Finally, the way in which the Council replies 
to the sixth paragraph of the recommendation 
concerning trade in arms constitutes an interest-
ing position: 
"The Council have noted the Assembly's 
concern regarding the dangers of the trade 
in arms in areas where peace is threatened. 
This is an important problem which involves 
different political factors in each country; 
it would be unrealistic to deal with it in 
the European framework only, since in fact 
this excludes the principal armaments 
exporting and importing countries. 
On the other hand, bearing in mind its 
responsibilities in this respect, every Euro-
pean country could draw relevant con-
clusions from the results of joint action 
that might be taken between countries of 
the same geographical area with a view 
to voluntary limitation of their own imports; 
such consultations, which would also bring 
in the main supplier countries, would indeed 
make it possible to envisage concerted 
limitation on the sales of conventional 
weapons." 
But the Council must not be content rf:o express 
a wish ; it must take the necessary steps to ensure 
that the wish becomes reality. Of course, such 
a problem cannot be dealt with "in the European 
framework only". Nevertheless, this is the frame-
work in which steps might be taken to implement 
the policy advocated by the Council. 
26. During the discussions in Committee on 
5th November 1979, the wish was also expressed 
that the Council deal with the question of traffic 
in arms - as distinct from trade in armaments 
- concerning which the Committee believes that 
the measures taken in each member country to 
ban or abolish such traffic should be co-ordinated 
so that Europe plays absolutely no part in oper-
ations dangerous for civil and international peace 
in certain parts of the world, particularly Africa, 
and for the security of people throughout the 
world, including Western Europe. Your Rap-
porteur can but endorse this wish, recalling that 
when the problems of international terrorism and 
the protection of diplomats were examined, the 
Council demonstrated that it considered matters 
relating to public order to be within its purview. 
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APPENDIX 
General report submitted by Mr. Schmidt, 
General Rapporteur of Working Group II 
Introduction 
European policy towards the armaments industry -
an ambiguous and often ill-defined notion 
The thoughts of Working Group II were 
dominated by two considerations which were 
perhaps not sufficiently elaborated but which 
seem to have played a major role in the reasoning 
of those who spoke. 
The first, a real paradox, is that France, now 
Europe's leading armaments producer, sends 80 % 
of its exports of military equipment to non-
European countries, whereas the EEC absorbs 
more than half the rt.otal of all its sales abroad. 
This explains France's major reservations 
towards anything that might limit its freedom 
of action, at least as long as Europe does not 
guarantee it the large-scale outlet it needs. Recent 
experience has shown that there is little immedi-
ate hope of this. Conversely, a European arma-
ments policy in which it played less than a full 
part would have little significance. 
The second is that the notion of an arma-
ments market can hardly be applied to Europe. 
In fact, there is no armaments market in the 
economic sense of the word, for conventional 
criteria of supply and demand ultimately play 
only a secondary role and the field in which 
traditional economic competition comes int.o effect 
is in reality very limited. There are certainly 
large-scale transactions but they are not to be 
seen in simple operational terms. Even within 
each country, they introduce many fact.ors whose 
interaction largely escapes analysis. A fortiori, 
there is no European armaments market since 
possible buyers negotiate with various entities 
with which they have different kinds of relation-
ship (diplomatic, strategic, etc.). 
This is one of the main difficulties of the 
subject which the Working Group had to tackle 
and the very remarkable report submitted by 
Mr. Plantey on the juridical obstacles to arma-
ments co-operation shed particularly strong light 
on this aspect of the problem by suggesting, as 
Professor Greenwood also did, a number of spe-
cific measures destined not to unsettle this state of 
affairs but to make it slightly less complex. 
Finally, before going w the heart of the 
debate, it should be indicated that the opposition, 
stressed only too often, between exports of arma-
ments and co-operation introduces a debate whose 
terms are clear only if the subject of arms sales 
is tackled in an ideological context. In fact, there 
are many intermediary formulae between co-oper-
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ation proper and pure and simple procurement, 
particularly in the case of the European market. 
Moreover, in the case of regions outside Europe, 
exports are one of the aims of co-operation. Thus 
to establish a balance sheet of the relative 
advantages of each possible form of co-operation, 
the benefits which one or other co-operating 
party may derive from exports should be 
included. A number of examples, such as all 
recent helicopters (Puma, Gazelle) or Alpha-Jet 
seem to show that co-operation has actually been 
a factor which encouraged exports and not the 
reverse. This aspect should be analysed in greater 
detail to discover why and to what extent. 
Finally, what is meant by co-operation Y 
To avoid confusion, I propose a broad, all-
embracing definition of co-operation to include 
any form of collaboration between firms of dif-
ferent nationalities in the field of military 
equipment. This approach will make it easier 
subsequently to distinguish between several types 
of collaboration, and in particular : 
( i) collaboration only at the level of 
exploitation ; 
(ii) collaboration covering more or less 
advanced production (co-production) ; 
(iii) collaboration going back to the pre-
design stage. 
Within each of these main categories, specific 
formulae are possible, i.e. different legal solutions 
according to the legal needs in each case with an 
equitable sharing of participation. 
The report will therefore first : identify the 
true obstacles to the development of a European 
armaments policy ; and, second : suggest and 
promote realistic solutions which should be the 
most effective way of overcoming the obstacles. 
CHAPTER I 
Difficulties and obstacles : true and false 
problems 
If it is accepted that the elaboration of 
European co-operation between armaments indus-
tries is a goal which, in one form or another, 
might be common to all our countries, the true 
difficulties in the way of any progress in the 
organisation of this industry at European level 
should be identified. Remarks made by those who 
know the most about the problem indicate that 
the true difficulties do not necessarily corres-
pond to the objections usually put forward in 
this field. 
APPENDIX 
The most evident obstacles are legal. They 
have been studied in depth by the WEU Stand-
ing Armaments Committee and the indications 
which, in one form or another, it has given 
about the results of this study show that these 
obstacles are far from insuperable. The political 
will of states might overcome them if, in many 
cases, they were not dealing with superstructures 
concealing other, more deep-rooted obstacles, some 
of which cannot be put aside so easily : in this 
field too, law is the visible expression of facts 
which are sometimes difficult to grasp but whose 
weight is evident. 
Intrinsically more important are the dif-
ficulties stemming from the objectively different 
interests of each of the possible partners in the 
economic field in the widest sense of the term. 
In fact, each country has its interests and most 
authors of papers submitted to Working Group II, 
stressed their legitimacy and the importance for 
the future of Europe of respecting regional con-
cerns and the economic, social and technological 
reservations of each state called upon to join a 
European association which committed its 
national armaments industry. 
In view of this European vocation, three 
types of contrasting interests may be discerned. 
First, countries with only a small armaments 
industry, whose situation and concerns were 
described accurately in Mr. de Geus' paper. They 
draw their main supplies from abroad and the 
aim of the national armaments industry is mainly 
direct economic profitability. Thus, specialisation 
by their national industries may offer them 
interesting prospects, which is obviously not the 
major concern of the larger industrial powers. 
Second, there is the case of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Europe's leading industrial 
power, but whose armaments industry is not yet 
at the level of industries handling civil pro-
duction. This leaves Germany greater economic 
freedom in armaments procurement problems 
since the armaments industry is not central to 
the economy. Furthermore, the Federal Republic 
does not yet have the necessary latitude to 
become an exporting nation. More generally, the 
limits imposed on Germany's freedom in its 
defence policy, particularly because of its place 
in the western system, induce it to seek greater 
integration in the military field and, to a certain 
extent, to subordinate its armaments production 
to this necessity. 
The third type is represented by France, 
whose aim is to have an independent defence 
system and whose armaments industry has a 
very considerable degree of independence. France 
therefore makes its armaments industry play a 
very large economic role since 42 % of its arma-
ments production is exported and this industry 
provides an economic lead and technological drive 
for all French industries (at times, this sector 
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accounted for about 30 % of all sums earmarked 
for research and development throughout French 
industry), which is not exactly the case on the 
other side of the Rhine. It cannot therefore 
accept co-operation which would limit its com-
mercial or technological freedom, not to speak 
of the particularly heavy burden of economic 
and social constraints which it has to take into 
account. 
This diversity of types of industrial situation 
obviously makes it difficult to find a common 
denominator meeting the individual interests of 
the principal partners, particularly since it is 
not always easy to draw a clear distinction 
between armaments industries and certain indus-
tries of a civil nature. In certain cases, such as 
the aeronautical or electronic industries, which 
play a major role in France, for instance, but 
also among the industries of the smaller powers, 
this intermingling is particularly evident. 
Finally, the political aspects, or strategic 
implications, of co-operation are extremely dif-
ficult to tackle from a unifying standpoint if 
this interpenetration is accepted. Can one reason-
ably link the problem of the armaments indus-
tries with a European industrial policy by 
normalising the armaments industry? 
This is one of the obvious things at stake 
in the debate, which is not at all academic, 
whatever may be said, about the responsibilities 
of the European Communities and the parlia-
mentary assembly which is to supervise them. 
Not only are there a number of juridical obstacles 
in the way of this normalisaJtion, but far more 
deep-rooted political differences in the highest 
sense of the word preclude thoughts of being able 
to go very far in this field as regards the part 
of the future which can be included in any 
calculation of estimates. 
The last and not the least of the obstacles, 
quite rightly mentioned in Professor Greenwood's 
report, arises from the absence of an appropriate 
framework of assessment allowing an overall 
opinion to be obtained not only of future oper-
ations but even of current or completed oper-
ations. The Director of the Aberdeen Centre for 
Defence Studies makes a number of suggestions 
which should be examined closely with a view 
to providing Europe with the instruments of 
information and analysis which seem essential 
if there is to be any progress in armaments 
co-operation. Inter alia, it is felt that traditional 
economic analyses of the "cost-effectiveness" type 
prove to be quite inadequate insofar as up to 
now they are incapable on the one hand of taking 
account of indirect macro-economic factors 
(employment, industrial structure) and on the 
other hand of including in the calculation non-
economic variables which are more difficult to 
quantify (independence, power). Finally, short-
term advantages perhaps obtained by co-oper-
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ation do not necessarily imply an advantageous 
long-term position. However, it is evident that 
the objective and full assessment of co-operation 
already carried out would be, at the very least, 
an essential prior condition to any serious 
thinking about future co-operation and its 
practice since it must take account of the overall 
interests, not all strictly economic, of each of 
the partners in order to work out the most 
suitable formulae for obtaining worthwhile eco-
nomic results. That is why the methodological 
research necessary for establishing a framework 
for assessing objectively the advantages of various 
co-operative operations, far from being gratuitous 
speculation, on the contrary constitutes valuable 
assistance in decision-taking in these matters, and 
much effort should still be made in this area. 
These difficulties seem infinitely more 
serious than those sometimes put forward when 
a political rather than an economic solution is 
being sought to the problem. Thus, the impos-
sibility of finding the framework for common 
developments does not lie in legal impediments 
or in so-called ideological incompatibility. Mr. 
Gazzo's report does justice to these false dif-
ficulties by underlining the essential role which 
might be played by European parliamentary 
supervision if it concentrated on these specific 
points and thus perhaps helped, at its level, to 
remove some of the abovementioned obstacles. 
CHAPTER II 
Ways to progress : concrete measures and 
flexible solutions 
There is no doubt that Working Group II 
conducted a realistic analysis of the situation and 
the possibilities available. It is therefore not 
surprising that most speakers considered that at 
the present juncture co-operation could only be 
a la carte. At the same time, they sought wide 
flexibility allo\ving changes of partner or other 
adjustments in the event of an operation proving 
less interesting than expected for one or other 
partner. Everyone knows that this has frequently 
happened in the past. 
From a legal standpoint, it was possible 
to make a few specific proposals concerning 
inter alia the institutional framework in which 
co-production operations might be carried out. 
Furthermore~ Mr. Plantey suggested a range 
of interesting, more general juridical possibilities 
(bilateral harmonisation, diplomatic conventions, 
etc.). But it is from an economic standpoint that 
this approach seems the most promising and that 
an analysis of the present situation provides the 
greatest number of factors favourable to 
increased co-operation between European coun-
tries. This realistic and flexible approach in no 
way conflicts - quite the contrary - with more 
all-embracing views of Europe's development, nor 
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does it prejudge the future of Europe in the 
armaments field. 
But if we wish to be m9re precise, we must 
know what is on the a la carte menu, to continue 
Professor Greenwood's well-chosen metaphor. 
Three questions then arise : Co-operate with 
whom Y How far Y In which sector Y But before 
~vorking out an answer to each of these questions, 
It should be recalled that any co-operative oper-
ation brings into play three separate entities: 
state governments, defence staffs and firms pro-
ducing military equipment. In each case, there-
fore, there is a complex system of arbitration 
which. it would be insufficient - and con-
sequently incorrect - to reduce to the level of 
states alone. 
This having been said, let us take the first 
question, i.e. who is to co-operate. The first 
case is co-operation with the United States. 
Mr. Mayer's paper underlined the general dif-
ficulties encountered in all co-operation between 
Europe and the United States and other speakers 
such as Mr. Doorenbos and Mr. Damm stressed 
a few specific aspects relating to trade practices 
in particular and the establishment of precise 
co-operative operations. 
Generally speaking, the difficulty stems 
from the asymmetry, to use Mr. Mayer's well-
found word, between Europe and the United 
States and between firms on the two continents 
at the industrial, technological and commercial 
levels. In general, this asymmetry often means 
comparatively higher costs for production in 
Europe. Account should be taken of the remarks 
by Mr. Deschamps to the effect that co-operation, 
as seen by certain circles which wished to make 
a unified Europe the single partner of the 
United States, in reality fostered American 
domination over Western Europe. In fact it is 
the United States that makes the most continuous 
effort to have a single European partner, but 
weak because of that, whereas the division of 
Europe allows it, paradoxically and in many 
ways, to negotiate better and above all to ensure 
the survival of its technological capability which 
would disappear in generalised co-production. 
Thus, the choice of SNECMA for co-production 
of aircraft engines is justified by the existence 
of an independent European industry with Rolls-
Royce. Fully open competition in Europe, or 
generalised co-production with the United States, 
would probably reduce European firms to a 
secondary role. Any sustained co-operation might 
then permanently compromise the future of the 
European armaments industry. 
It was underlined that the United States 
sought merely to purchase patents and that it 
imposed its language, and those who, like 
Mr. Wall, advocate the development of the 
two-way street \vish to see it organised on the 
basis of a prior compromise which, in exchange 
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for what the United States imposes on Europe, 
would, for instance, have the United States adopt 
the metric system. But the main thing is to agree 
on what is counted as procurement on the United 
States side. It is perhaps too much to wish to 
include only purchases of weapons systems. But 
it is certainly wrong to count all the expenditure 
involved in the American military presence in 
Europe. 
However this may be,, Western Europe's 
research capability must be preserved and close 
consideration given to the practice of compen-
sation which some wish to be global over a time-
span fixed in advance, five years, for instance, 
and which others wish in every case Ito be set at 
a technological level equal to that of the products 
purchased in the United States. 
Intra-European co-operation for its part will 
probably assume different forms depending on 
whether it is between large industrial powers or 
with smaller countries. 
When it is a matter of large industrial 
powers, i.e. mainly the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Republic and France, the difficulty is 
to achieve an equitable solution in view of the 
fact that the industrial development of these 
three countries has been different or even some-
times divergent, which has led to negative effects, 
particularly where Franco-British co-operation 
is concerned. The best approach would appa-
rently be to start co-operation at the preliminary 
research stage on the basis of a definition of 
requirements agreed by the buyers and sub-
sequently in a second stage define a method of 
co-operation .ensuring a satisfactory sharing of 
responsibilities which is, above all, worked out in 
advance. Here, the formation of a specific firm 
for the production of each family of armaments 
is a solution which has proved its worth, not 
only in the case of Airbus but also for various 
families of weapons. 
In the event of co-operation between the 
largest and the smallest countries, it is quite 
evident that it must take a different form, 
account being taken of the needs and capabilities 
of each country. The notion of fair return is 
obviously not of the same importance in this 
case. But for the smaller countries, what counts 
first of all is that co-operation should be more 
attractive financially than the procurement of 
American equipment, which raises the problem 
of prices, and the delicate question of com-
pensation. Second, there must be very close 
regard for the independence of firms and the 
technological independence of these countries. 
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Turning now to the actual content of co-oper-
ation, most speakers underlined that, Ito have 
any chance of success, co-operation had to begin 
before a country could establish any sort of 
priority in order, as far as possible, to associate 
the planned operation with national honour (the 
words are Mr. Wall's). In other words, in most 
cases, co-operation should start at the design or 
even pre-design stage (preparatory study stage). 
It must then cover all production operations and, 
finally,, as Mr. de Geus underlined, if it is to be 
really effective, it must also extend to the main-
tenance and upkeep of the equipment produced. 
It emerges from these remarks that it is the 
sectors in which the armaments industry is the 
most closely linked with civil production, such 
as the aircraft and computer sectors, where the 
industry itself is already very largely inter-
nationalised, that co-operation is the easiest. In 
the case of traditional equipment for the army, 
where firms, often nationalised, are the privileged 
suppliers of certain national armies, co-operation 
often proves more difficult and has to be viewed 
more in terms of technical normalisation than in 
truly economic terms. 
In this general context, naval shipbuilding 
is an intermediary stage. Obviously the first 
steps should be taken in areas where co-operation 
is easiest, particularly as these sectors are pro-
bably the ones whose economic and technical 
future is the most promising. We should there-
fore not be too disturbed if, for instance, the 
French army continues for a long time to come 
to prefer French vehicles and the British army 
British vehicles. 
Conclusions 
The search for an operational time scale 
The overall thinking of this Working Group 
was not concerned with the immediate future, 
which is already fully determined, nor was it 
concerned with the very long term where any-
thing is possible and where everything may be 
changed by scientific and technical upheavals 
which are yet impossible to foresee. It is very 
difficult today to see what Europe or European 
co-operation, in any field whatsoever, will be at 
the end of this century, which is not very far 
away. But a medium-term horizon, i.e. ten to 
fifteen years hence, should allow steps to be taken 
now to set Europe's course for a far longer 
period. It is in this context that what some may 
consider to be the rather disillusioned realism 
of the preoccupations and solutions advocated 
by this group should be placed. 
9 
PRINTED IN FRANCe STRASBOURG 
